Research
My research looks to the nature of various interpersonal phenomena—in particular, love—for solutions to first- and second-order ethical questions. I am especially interested in questions related to the nature of normativity and moral learning.
Publications & Under Review
Three Sources of Incapacity in Anorexia Nervosa (forthcoming)
Bioethics
Patients who are diagnosed with anorexia nervosa (AN patients) characteristically refuse to receive medical treatment, including life‐saving treatment, for their illness. These refusals are generally not honored on the grounds that AN patients are incapable of making autonomous medical decisions regarding their illness. Despite being widely shared by medical and legal experts, the judgment that AN patients are incapable of medical decision‐making lacks a sound theoretical basis in the existing bioethics literature. This paper aims to fill this gap in the literature by offering a novel explanation of AN patients’ incapacity.
Love and Unselfing (forthcoming)
The Philosophical Quarterly
When we attempt to characterize a suitably impartial moral standpoint, we find that it must be simultaneously detached (to be unbiased and accurate) and attached (to be able to motivate us and enable us to see reasons and values) in a way that it seems no perspective can be. Call this the problem of interested detachment. This chapter shows that by examining this problem in the context of personal love, we discover a novel solution to it.
Action, Slurs, and Ideologies (2024)
Book chapter in Harmful Speech and Contestation (Palgrave Macmillan, ed. Mihaela Popa-Wyatt)
This chapter offers a novel account of how uses of slurs reinforce and strengthen the pernicious ideologies they cue by drawing on work from the philosophy of action.
Reasons for Love and the Beloved’s irreplaceability
Under review
While it is widely agreed that normative reasons for love exist, there is little consensus on what these reasons are. This chapter defends a version of the “Dignity View” of reasons for love: We are justified in loving another person to the extent that we fully see and appreciate his value as a unique person. I show that this view does justice to a range of intuitions we have about love, including about the beloved’s irreplaceability and love’s selectivity.
Sharing Points of View
Under review
Loving another person changes our normative situation; there is a sense in which lovers “merge” or “become one.” Is merging compatible with individual autonomy or self-governance? This chapter argues that for these to be compatible, lovers must resolve their differences by reasoning together from the moral standpoint. To be self-governing in love, then, we must recognize the moral standpoint as authoritative.
Philosophy of Love
Constructivism, Love, and the Agent’s standpoint
Draft available
This paper addresses the worry that constructivists about reasons cannot account for the normative significance of an agent’s deepest commitments, since these seemingly cannot be reduced to value judgments. Focusing especially on the commitment of love, I offer a general account of the role that pre-reflective commitments play in practical deliberation according to the (Humean) constructivist.
Love and Moral Learning
In progress
This paper suggests that the experience of love, especially in early life, plays an indispensable role in a person’s moral development because of its lasting impact on how she identifies with objects outside of her (physical) self.
Metaethics & Normative Ethics
How Other People Give Us Reasons
In progress
This paper develops an account of how other people can give us reasons or change the content of our practical reasons. Using interpersonal love as my case study, I defend the view that other people can give us reasons directly.
The General Standpoint
In progress
This paper offers a characterization of the general standpoint (which my dissertation argues personal love commits us to occupying) as the standpoint persons seek when trying to reason with one another in good faith. My proposal differs from competing conceptions in that it incorporates the particular features of the perspectives of the persons involved. This, I argue, enables it to do justice to the significance of our close personal relationships where competing conceptions fail.
Sharing Normative Space
In progress
This paper argues that all direct social interactions involve some form of merging (becoming “one” with another). The upshot is that insofar as we participate in any form of social interaction at all, we must recognize morality’s authority in order that our reasons and actions be our own. We have reason to be moral because we are rational, social creatures.
What “Ideally Coherent Eccentrics” Fail to See
In progress
While it seems obvious that agents such as an ideally coherent Caligula who enjoys torturing others for fun are making some kind of moral mistake, pinpointing the nature of such mistakes has proven difficult for metaethicists. This chapter suggests that we can offer a compelling diagnosis of Caligula’s mistake by carefully examining the nature of personal interactions and the role of a phenomenon I call “unselfing” in practical deliberation.
Small morality
In progress
This paper defends the moral significance of small, ordinary acts such as watering potted plants or caring for a pet. These seemingly unremarkable acts, I suggest, are central to cultivating accurate moral perception. Moreover, acknowledging their moral significance can help shed light on the age-old question: “Why be moral?”
Katie Wong 